Arshad khan|ANW
Islamabad, Pakistan – President Asif Ali Zardari on Thursday ratified the 27th Constitutional Amendment, enacting the most sweeping overhaul of Pakistan’s military and judicial structures in decades. Passed amid fierce opposition protests and judicial backlash, the amendment fundamentally alters Article 243, tilting the tri-services balance decisively toward the army while shielding its highest echelons from prosecution.
At its core, the reform creates the post of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), to be held concurrently by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Incumbent Field Marshal Asim Munir, elevated to five-star rank in May—only the second Pakistani officer after Ayub Khan to receive the designation—now commands the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN). The office of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), currently held by General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, will be abolished on November 27.
A new Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), restricted to army officers and appointed in consultation with the CDF, will oversee nuclear assets for an initial three-year term, extendable by another three. Five-star ranks, previously honorary, are now constitutional offices conferring lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution and retention of uniform and privileges for life. Removing such an officer requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority—far stricter than the simple majority needed to dismiss an elected government.
Constitutional expert Reema Omer warned that lifelong immunity undermines the rule of law. “These are not mere honors for national heroes,” she told Al Jazeera. “They imply real power consolidation.” A retired three-star general, speaking anonymously, agreed: “This is designed to entrench the army chief’s authority.”
Hours after ratification, the government amended service laws. Under the revised Army Act, Munir’s tenure as COAS—previously set to end in 2027 after a 2023 extension from three to five years—now resets upon his CDF notification, potentially extending until November 2030.
The timing, six months after Pakistan’s four-day May conflict with India, has fueled speculation. Islamabad claims it shot down five Indian jets and achieved a decisive victory. Georgetown University’s Aqil Shah argued the confrontation provided political cover for “unprecedented role expansion” under the banner of “unity of command.” State Minister for Law Aqeel Malik countered that the changes “plug security gaps” and formalize integration for swift responses in hybrid warfare.
Former Vice Admiral Ahmed Saeed called the reform “forward-looking,” insisting the 1970s-era command model was obsolete for 21st-century threats. “This isn’t about fixing failures but future-proofing success,” he said.
Critics, however, see institutional overreach. The abolished CJCSC, though largely symbolic, allowed cross-service input. “The PAF and PN risk losing strategic autonomy and senior promotion influence,” the retired general warned. “Resentment could fracture cohesion—the very synergy the amendment claims to build.”
Security analyst Majid Nizami questioned merging CDF and COAS roles. “A dedicated integration officer would have modernized without dominance,” he said. Shah added that the reform “codifies the army’s de facto hegemony” over the navy and air force.
Nuclear command also shifts decisively. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) has long been army-led despite nominal CJCSC oversight. The CNSC formalizes this, though Saeed insisted civilian oversight remains intact under “constitutional clarity.”
Politically, the amendment is seen as a capitulation. No prime minister has completed a full term, while three of four military rulers governed over nine years each. Former COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa promised in 2022 to end political interference, but rights groups say military influence has grown.
Field Marshal Munir’s profile has soared. He has met US President Donald Trump multiple times, earning praise as Trump’s “favorite field marshal.” Meanwhile, jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan accuses Munir of orchestrating his 2022 ouster and the crackdown on Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Despite PTI-backed independents winning the most seats in the rigged 2024 elections, Shehbaz Sharif’s PML-N formed the government with military backing.
Shah argued the PML-N, lacking legitimacy, relies on Munir to counter Khan’s challenge. “This amendment institutionalizes the supremacy of the uniform over the ballot,” he said.
Opposition parties boycotted the vote, decrying a “constitutional surrender.” Civil society and judges warned of eroded civilian control. The military’s media wing declined to comment.
Supporters frame the changes as national security imperatives. Critics fear a destabilized tri-services equilibrium and weakened democratic checks. As Pakistan navigates India tensions, economic crises, and political turmoil, the amendment marks a pivotal—and contentious—shift in civil-military dynamics.
With Munir’s authority now constitutionally unassailable, the question remains: will unified command strengthen Pakistan’s defense—or deepen its institutional imbalances?